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Abstract 
Insider threat is one of the most dangerous security threat, and a much more complex issue. These insiders can be a former or a 
disgruntled employee or any business associate that has or had an authorised access to information for any particular 
organization. They have control and security measures. Hence continuous monitoring is essential to track each and every activity 
within the network. Log management is a strong technique which includes both Log analysis with event correlation which 
provides the root cause of any attack and network can be protected from security violations. Though intrusion detection is 
complex process, while checking the ability to detect intrusive behaviour within the internal environment, it has to take care of 
suppressing the false alarm rate. Some strong approach is required on the basis of which decisions can be taken fast. This paper 
proposes a probabilistic approach which illustrates the frequency of occurrence of event in percentage while still considering the 
false alarm rate at an acceptable level. 
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1. Introduction 
Computer network plays an important role for information exchange. The increasing amount of valuable 
information along with expansion of enabling technologies has increased the percentage of threats. These threats are 
not only from outside but also from inside. Traditionally organizations have considered focusing more on mitigating 
threats from outside the organizational boundary [6]. However through survey and history research on threat 
analysis insider incidents are more in number and costly than external attacks. 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Increased concerns about the insider threat which eventually increased awareness of the insiders led to detect 
malicious insiders through significant technique. Log management is one of the more capable techniques [10]. Log 
analysis and event correlation are the two main aspects of the Log Management. Log analysis and event correlation 
are closely related to each other in the collection of information in detection of insider threat. For event correlation 
log analysis is required so that it filters out unwanted data and executes one or more actions. Unless this event 
correlation technique is used, handling arrival rate of network events becomes difficult [7]. This investigation 
process provides a complete picture of an incident in order to find the root cause of a particular threat or an attack. 
This paper focuses on identifying malicious insiders while achieving low false alarm rate.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses overview of Literature Survey. Section III represents 
proposed design and its goal. Section IV describes system architecture. Framework of the proposed system is 
described in section V. Result analysis is illustrated in section VI. Finally section VII concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
Network security is more important to protect the organization against internal and external attacks. A strong real-
time analysis of logs has the potential to greatly increase an organization’s understanding of insider’s behavior or 
malicious activity which is occurring across the network. Log analysis is used for monitoring and automation of 
large cloud computing environments [9]. Along with that event correlation is considered as one of those activities 
which analyze individual pieces of information in to diagnose the root causes of problems on the network and filter 
the alarms generated as a result of those problems into a single composite event [14]. Event correlation activities 
allow large volume of events comprises of time reduced to a set of alarms that is manageable for an analyst. In the 
field of fault and intrusion detection more robust event correlation solution is necessary. 
     In the area of log analysis, two types of automatic analysis tools have been observed. First type is Offline 
monitoring that includes logwatch [2], SLAPS-2 [3], or Addamark LMS [4]. These offline tools monitor log files by 
capturing log records and checks for configurable patterns and generate alerts. They helps to determine which log 
file to consider, what error patterns to match and what alert action to take. Many a times an hour or once a day these 
offline tools can be run. The drawback in case of these offline tools are that they do not provide support for 
analyzing the logs with respect to the time. Hence there is lack of real time data, because of which preventive action 
cannot be taken at right time. Parsing and recording the generation time will be done by Addamark LMS [4], but the 
lack of real-time component. Tools like logsurfer [5], Swatch [6], LoGS [8] and Splunk [12] come under Online 
solutions. All of these programs run continuously watching one or more log files, or receiving input from some other 
program. For ignoring duplicate events Swatch [6] provides better support and for changing rules based on the time 
of arrival. Splunk [12] have done a great job at scaling to large log volumes and making complex correlations 
feasible, but sometimes this is big item for comparatively small scale organization. Logsurfer [5] is much more 
flexible because of its dynamically changing rules based on events or time. But later on complexity is been observed 
in the same due its dynamic nature. Lisp is used in writing rules in LoGS [8]. This provides more flexibility in 
designing rule but requires lot of training.  
     Bing and Erickson [14] points out the weaknesses of the current log file monitoring tools, and discusses the 
importance of extending the log file monitoring techniques with more complex heuristic approaches, including event 
correlation. Some event correlation tools are general enough. Examples of these architecture agnostic tools include 
the Syslog Heuristic Analysis and Response Program (SHARP), which extends an existing syslog infrastructure 
with event correlation capabilities [14], and the Simple Event Correlator (SEC), an open source, Perl-based tool that 
is lightweight enough to run in a distributed environment and robust enough to do centralized correlation as 
well[1][7][11]. Having analyzed prior work in insider detection, we propose a probabilistic technique for identifying 
insiders. Incidentally, SEC is the event correlation engine which was chosen as a study model for this research. 
 
3. Design & Goal 
The proposed easily configurable log file monitor is an open-source tool with rule based log analysis and event 
correlation approach. This is platform independent and lightweight tool which provides accurate result that reduces 
the human intervention. Along with that other aspects like simple configuration and low consumption of resources 
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which have been considered for this purpose. There were four goals that were set when designing the system in 
order to provide more accurate system, they are as follows 
 
x Be able to handle large amount of log records 
x Be able to handle input events regardless of their format and should be platform independent 
x Be able to correlate events across the systems within the network( no batch processing) 
x Correlation rules must be easy to read, modify and create 
4. System Architecture 
To protect information assets and to keep the health of the network at an appropriate level, we have developed 
standardized log file monitor/filter. It consists of four modules. Figure 1 depicts the proposed system architecture. 
Each module has a specific, well-defined task to perform. Each module passes on the data ahead. Four modules are 
mentioned below 
 
x Module 1 : Log Collection 
x Module 2 : Log Analysis 
x Module 3 : Event Correlation 
x Module 4 : Calculate  probability  
 
 
Fig. 1. Proposed System 
4.1. Module1 : Log Collection 
Log files are significant data source in this operation. Collecting data from many different resources gives 
system administrators and security experts a picture of the current state of the network. In this proposed technique it 
uses log file as the basic input into event correlation system. Log file is composed of individual log entries which are 
consists of a single line of text [7]. These Log records are collected at server from different clients .Figure 2 shows 
the actual log collection process. Here we have considered Security Logs and System Logs. 
Server runs on Linux for security purpose, Server monitors events appended to the /var/log/messages. Each time 
/var/log/messages is rotated, a new instance of /var/log/messages is opened and processed from the beginning.  
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Fig. 2. Log Collection 
4.2. Module 2: Log Analysis 
The coding part is written in Python. Huge amount of log records are collected from different sources . To be able to 
handle input events irrespective of their format, regular expression is used for recognizing them. Rule based 
approach is used here for processing events and for eliminating unwanted data [1].This rule based approach has a 
specific format which consists of certain fields [1]. The type field indicates the type of rule. Next the pattern field of 
the rule defines the pattern for recognizing input events, while the ptype field defines its type. The desc field of a 
rule defines the scope of event correlation and influences the number of operations created by the rule. The 
significance of action field is that when input message will match the regular expression pattern of any particular 
rule, it will fork a command. Log analysis process can be explained further in configuration file in section. 
4.3. Module 3: Event Correlation 
Simply anything which happened at some moment in time which is defined as an event could be an action or 
occurrence identified by a program, such as pressing a key or clicking a mouse button. In computing environment, 
the term event is also used for that message which conveys what has happened and when it has happened. Hence to 
define event or a sequence of events on individual system or a group of systems is useful in the detection of insiders. 
As more clients are added, the ability to correlate activities which are happening across the network increases [10]. 
Figure 3 shows that with each successive increasing level of the hierarchy, new type of behaviour may be detected 
and hence the ability to detect malicious activity also increases. 
 
Fig. 3. Event Hierarchy 
Event Correlation means relation between different events. It is usually done to obtain higher level knowledge from 
information..Number of events is happening across the network, so out of these thousands of events which event to 
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consider and which event to skip, this decision has to be taken in order to avoid unnecessary processing. Events 
which are considered here for malicious activities are unsuccessful login attempts at client, rebooting of server and 
ICMP request. Below we have discussed the mathematical technique for event correlation. 
4.4. Module 4: Calculate probability 
Effectiveness is one of the characteristic of the intrusion detection. It defines to what degree   it can detect the 
intrusions and how good it is at rejecting false alarms. In order to find intrusive behavior probabilistic approach is 
used in this work. S.Axelsson [15] illustrates the importance of rate of events with the help of probability calculation 
and also considered low false alarm rate. A random experiment produces only a finite number of mutually exclusive 
and equally likely outcomes. Then the probability of an event A is defined as the ratio of number of favorable 
outcomes to A to the  
P (A) =   Number of favourable outcomes to A 
 
                                          Total number of possible outcomes                          (1) 
 
Only a few events (intrusions) of interest are present due to the fact that large amount of non-events (benign 
activity) are present in audit trail. Hence basic rate of event, the base rate is required while calculating the 
probability [15]. Conditional probability is used to calculate the probability of any mutually exclusive event with 
any other event within the given sample set. Bayes' theorem is an application of conditional probabilities. For that, 
we consider I as an intrusive behaviour and ¬I as a non-intrusive behaviour respectively and A and ¬A denote the 
presence or absence of an intrusion alarm. 
Detection rate or True Positive rate: P (I/A) 
False alarm rate or False Positive rate: P (¬I/A) 
Our ultimate interest is that P (I/A) (Bayesian detection rate) and P (¬I/¬A) (True negative rate) remains as large as 
possible. Applying Bayes’ theorem to calculate P (I|A), results into 
 
P (I/A) =             P (I) P (A|I) 
 
                                                                           P (I) ڄP (A|I) + P (¬I) ڄP (A|¬I)                               (2) 
 
Similarly for P(¬I|¬A) 
 
   P (¬I/¬A) =             P (¬I) P (¬A|¬I) 
 
                                                                        P (¬I) ڄP (¬A|¬I) + P (I) ڄP (¬A|I)                            (3) 
 
As per the assumptions [15] by considering 1000,000 audit records per day we have  
P (I) = 2/100000; 
P (¬I) = 1 –P (I) = 0.99998 
Since 0<= P (A/I) <= 1 the equation (2) will have its desired maximum for P (A/I) = 1and P (A/¬I) = 0 which gives 
the most beneficial outcome as far as the false alarm rate is concerned. But practically which is not feasible hence 
we took the value of P (A/I) as 0.98, and we get  
 
                                                        P (I/A) = 0.0019599                                                                       (4) 
 
Hence multiplying the equation (4) with the probability of any event, we are calculating the total system’s 
probability of occurrence for that event. At the end whichever probability we are getting based on that system admin 
will take decision about consideration of those probabilities having thought of priorities for them. 
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5. Framework 
At server end all log entries are recorded in file systems .Those records can be found in /var/log/messages path. In 
order to see current entries in the log records, action can be performed on command line with option as in less 
/var/log/auth.log. It often enables us to find out which users are logged on to the originating systems by receiving 
timely notification of certain types of probes or attacks. This information can help to identify hackers or 
compromised accounts. Further in order to track events logged by system components, we will get it in the syslog 
text file. The option is less   /var/log/syslog. This log file monitor depends upon pattern matching. For this reason 
Python is used, as Python is used for both scripting and for creating complex applications. Due to its versatility, 
scalability it fulfils diverse coding needs within an organization. Python’s support of the rapid application 
development methodology enables system administrators to create and customize tools. The log file monitor has 
main file (main.py), configuration file (logcorrelator.conf) and logWatcher file (logWatcher.py).  
5.1. Main file (main.py) 
Code starts from main.py,def main (): Firstly main () reads configuration (logcorrelator.conf) file and loads all the 
rules. After that it reads log file and finds the particular line matching the rules. If it finds particular line matching 
the rule, it looks up the action for that rule and executes that action. Rule types and actions are further discussed in 
the configuration file section. Below mentioned are the functions inside main.py.  
5.2. Configuration file (logcorrelator.conf) 
The function def initFromConf (): is used in main file to initialize the system by reading the configuration file. 
Figure 4 defines the function def initFromConf ():Rules mentioned in the configuration file perform actions. The 
knowledge of configuration language is necessary to understand rules presented below.  
 
Fig. 4. Function addressing configuration file. 
Single Rule: The Single rule immediately executes an action when an event has matched the rule [1]. This rule 
looks for successful password entries over ssh connection. Figure 5 depicts the single rule that is used to check the 
string for accepted password. The Continue field specifies the point-of-continue after a match by pattern. After an 
event has matched the rule, search for matching rules in the configuration file will continue from the next rule for 
which takenext is mentioned in Continue field. 
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Fig. 5. Single Rule 
SingleWithThreshold Rule: The SingleWithThreshold rule runs event correlation operations for counting 
repeated instances of the same event during T seconds, and taking an action if N events are observed [1]. This 
regular expression analyses the icmp ping requests received from a particular source. It gets the number of ping 
requests by each source and also the time durations in which the requests are received. Figure 6 shows the 
SingleWiththreshold rule used for obtaining ICMP repeated events where it matches the string for 10 times. 
 
Fig. 6. SingleWithThreshold Rule 
SingleWithSuppress Rule: The SingleWithSuppress rule runs event correlation operations for filtering repeated 
instances of the same event during T seconds [1]. The value of T is defined by the window field. Figure 7 defines the 
SingleWithSuppress rule which looks for failed password attempts over ssh connection. It provides a window of 3 
which means any more consecutive failed password attempts will contribute towards counting of malicious activity. 
 
Fig. 7. SingleWithSuppress Rule 
Calendar Rule : The Calendar rule was designed to capture events at specific times [1]. Unlike all other rules, this 
rule reacts only to the system clock, ignoring other input. This is calendar based rule showed in Figure 8 defined in 
such a way that shutdown in above example on sat or sun would be taken as a negative activity but a shutdown 
during any other days would be considered normal. 
 
Fig. 8. Calendar Rule 
Actions are designed for generating output events .Following actions are currently supported: 
x beep = generate alert by sending a beep 
x email = send mail to system admin 
x none = no action 
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5.3. LogWatcher  file (logWatcher.conf) 
This is a helper file used for live analysis. Once the role of main file is done reading current log file, it passes over 
control to this. This will then keep on polling the log file for any new changes; it will apply the same rule and 
actions to that new change. In this way main file, logcorrelator.conf file and logWacher file, these files are 
interlinked to each other and run simultaneously to achieve the task of identifying insider threat. 
6. Result Analysis 
We have previously described several ways in which the log file filter can be used. After receiving log entries 
from different clients, filtration process is done in which it matches the regular expression. The defined analyse 
function look for file path first and then start performing correlation process. The output of login, logout and failed 
events on respective ip ,we are getting by using two mathematical model for event correlation.The first one is 
Causality graph and the other technique is finite state machine.This result we can see in graphical format in Figure 
9, where this graph consists of two axis. X: Axis represents ip and Y: Axis represents no of events (both positive 
and failed) 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Graph of auth log 
Addition of one more technique into event correlation makes it more hybrid. By using random matrix theory, we can 
correlate events from different ip’s to detect a DDOS kind of attack. Also we can obtain the time difference between 
those ip events, which can again provide useful information. Figure 10 shows the result with reference to the 
equations defined in previous section 4.4. 
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Fig. 10. Calculated probability 
Figure 9 shows graph with two event correlation techniques where as Figure 11 shows graph with three event 
correlation techniques together. This graph also consists of two axis. X: Axis represents ip and Y: Axis represents 
seconds 
 
 
Fig. 11. New graph with three techniques 
Figure 12 indicates how many startup events and shutdown events have occurred on server and ICMP request on ip 
172.24.0.221.Based on equtions defined in section 4.4, probability of startup and shutdown has been calculated.  
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Fig. 12. Syslog output  
7. Conclusion 
A log file monitor is a valuable tool which provides information about the probability of malicious activity .Current 
work represents structured method for detecting insider activities using log files. This is ongoing detection 
process.In the near term; research will work towards detecting insider activities from different networking devices 
along with which prevention approach should also be incorporated. 
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